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Law and The Modern Mind. By Jerome Frank. New York,
Brentano's, 1930. pp. xvii, 362. $4.
THis book contains a provocative examination of the judicial thinking pro-
cess in the light of the many recent studies on the workings of the human
intellect. Starting with the premise that law must adapt itself to the
modern mind in order to meet the needs of modern civilization, the author
builds up his definition of the modern mind and indicates how the adapta-
tion can be made.
By telling us what ig wrong with most legal thinking and why it is
wrong, the author lays the foundation for his definition. His main indict-
ment is that legal thinking is based upon the myth that law is or can be
certain and predictable. Many instances are given in support of this propo-
sition. The sub-myth that judges do not make law, but enunciate law
which is already in existence, is pointed out as a supporting incident of
the basic myth. Judges and jurists who are subject to the delusion that
law is fixed and certain and that there is no such thing as judicial legis-
lation are criticized for finding too much solace in the language of the
law as an aid to rationalizing their behavior. In his discussion of this
legal "verbomania" and the use of fictions, the author displays a keen
understanding both of the opinions that judges render to explain their
actions, and of the works of Ogden, Richards, Vaihinger, and other modern
writers on the relation of language to thinking. Further evidences of
the mythical search for certainty are found in the attempts at codification,
the development of a mechanistic law, and pronouncements of judges and
jurists. Only such men as Holmes, Cardozo, Hand, Pound, Lehman, Cook,
Green, Llewellyn, Roscoe Pound, Jhering, Wurzel and Demogue are com-
pletely or partially absolved from believing in the basic myth that law is
not and should not be subject to change.
Whether or not we agree that the legal profession is correct in believ-
ing in the certainty of the law, or that the author is correct in his observa-
tions that the profession so believes, it will be desirable, for the purposes
of this review, and in the absence of an adequate technique for checking
conclusively his observations, to assume the correctness of his view that
most legal thinking is founded on the unrealistic basis that law is and
can be certain and unchangeable.
One of the most interesting parts of this book is the author's explanation
for the adherence of the legal profession to the basic myth. His explana-
tion, which is based on the new psychological studies of the child and the
family, is startlingly simple. Assuming the verity of the proposition that
the child is father to the judge, he details the thought processes of the
child for us." Being a wishful thinker, the child discounts change, chance
and 'circumstance to conform to his wishes and employes the magic of
words to aid him in constructing his over-simple and unified world, irrespec-
tive of the fact that his world does not correspond with the world of ex-
perience. In this wishfully constructed world the Father plays the rle
IProust, in his REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST, has an excellent micros-
copic study of child psychology and the influence of childhood thought, ways
and experiences upon adult thinking.
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of the Infallible Judge, who controls the child's cosmos. According to the
author most men never outgrow these childish thought ways and conse-
quently seek to satisfy their childhood wishes through the "rediscovery of
father." Considering the Law as functionally resembling the Father-as-
Judge, the author complete the transference of childhood thinking to the
judge.
With this analysis of childhood thinking and its relation to the law as
a background, the author defines the modern mind as "a mind free of
childish emotional drags, a mature mind," a pragmatic mind which does
not adhere to a philosophy opposed to change. The scientific mind of to-
day is cited as the outstanding illustration.
Undoubtedly, present day scientists have displayed no childish opposi-
tion to change. One has only to read Eddington,- Jeans 3 and Lewis 4 or
to view the reformulations of the atomic theory from Rutherford to HeiEen-
berg and Schrbdinger to be convinced of the willingness of the scientists
to accept change. But why should law be a better substitute for the role
of the father than the "laws" of science? Frank asserts that this is so,
but gives no adequate reason why it is so. In his treatment of scientific
training and the law, he fails to understand completely Cook's contribution
to modernizing legal thinking. The teaching and writings S of Cook have
done much to bring a knowledge of the scientific method to jurists and law-
yers.- After coming in contact with many who have been influenced by
Cook, Llewellyn, Green and their modern-minded confr6res, one cannot
help questioning Frank's observation that most of the legal profession is
infantile in its thinking. There are today probably as many modern
minded judges and lawyers as there are modern minded scientists; but
perhaps because of the many differences between law and science the re-
sults of the modern mindedness in law are not even as remotely noticeable
as they are in science.
Much of the author's preoccupation with child psychology and its appli-
cation to the law strikes one as, what Eddington calls, "a well-meaning
kind of nonsense." While reading this book many will doubtless experience
the irritation that they felt when they first read some of the writings
of Freud, Jung and Alfred Adler. This should not unnecessarily disturb
us, because too often the originalities and paradoxes of the present be-
come the platitudes and prejudices of the future. But even admitting that
the newness of some of his ideas and thoughts irritates us, if we attempt
to view the author's thesis with some of the dispassionate constructive
scepticism that he advocates, we shall detect many falterings in the march
of his argument. The studies of B1. Piaget upon which the author relies
so heavily are not free from criticism. It is highly questionable whether
children are as averse to change and chance as Piaget and Frank would
lead us to believe; many of us know differently from experience. Even
conceding that children think as Piaget tells us they do, are his observations
of children with an agrarian or a patriarchal European background ap-
plicable to children in this country, who only occasionally see their fathers
in the interim between their own comings and goings to camps and schools
and the home-comings of the father from his business and other pursuits?
Even if the present generation of the legal profession in this country
2 SPACE, TImE AND GRAVrrATION (1920) ; and THE NATURn OF THE PHYSI-
CAL WORLD (1929).
- THn MYSTrIOUS UNIvERsE (1930).
4 THE ANATOMY OF SCIENCE (1926).
S The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE
L. J. 457; The Present Status of the Lack of Mutuality Rule (1927) 36
YALE L. J. 897; Scientific Metwd and The Law (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 303.
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has not considered the father as the infallible judge, it must be admitted
there has been a reluctance to admit changes in the law. To a large ex-
tent this reluctance has been justified by circumstances: the majority of the
cases coming before the courts were governed by previously decided con-
troversies. It was only in the few, much talked of cases, that the courts
innovated. In our own day the number of these "new" cases has un-
doubtedly grown; in a society undergoing as much change as ours there
is less guidance to be obtained from the past. With the increased changes
that will undoubtedly come in the future, it will probably be more difficult
than ever to formulate "rules" of law that will last.
Because of the many changes which are going on about us in both our
environment and viewpoints it is well for the legal profession to re-exam-
ine its thought processes. If the preoccupation with the workings of the
mind does not result in creative paralysis, it is usually well justified. In
literature Andr6 Gide and James Joyce have carried on a scathing inves-
tigation of the craft of fiction and have made original and vital contribu-
tions to their field; in music Stravinsky and Ravel have been preoccupied
with the workings of the musical mind and have benefited by it; in art
Monet, Picasso and Mattise have re-examined and reformulated the theories
of painting; in medicine Drs. White 6 and Crookshankr have started many
of the doctors thinking about their thinking; in psychology and philosophy
the researches of Freud, Whitehead, Russell, Croce and Dewey have re-
sulted in an unusual fecundity; in politics and history Professor Laswell
has just contributed a memorable book 8 based on a clear and exhaustive
study of the best of the modern studies on psychology; and in law those
judges and jurists, such as Holmes, Cardozo, Hand, Pound, Lehman, Hut-
cheson, Cook, Llewellyn, Green and Roscoe Pound, who have thought most
about their thinking, have made the best contributions to law and juris-
prudence.
As a further contribution to the study of the judicial process it might be
well if some of our able and intellectually honest judges recorded, without
too much exercise of the literary process of exclusion and inclusion, the
many thoughts and reactions that they experience while deciding a case
and writing their opinion. Andr6 Gide gives us a suggestive example of
this in his Journal des Fauxe Monnayeurs which he kept while wrlting
The Counterfeiters. Such a recordation would undoubtedly give us a more
adequate understanding of how judges think and decide cases.
If Frank's book does nothing more than to provoke more judges and
lawyers to examine their thinking and to realize how important individual
psychology is in the judging process, it will have ably served its purpose.
It should do that.
New York City. OSCAR Cox.
The Public and Its Government. By Felix Frankfurter. New
Haven, Yale University Press, 1930. pp. 170. $2.
CHARLES BEARD remarked not long ago to this reviewer that no first class
political thinking had appeared in the United States in the twentieth cen-
tury. The quality of this little book of Frankfurter's, modest as it is
in quantity, should lighten Beard's discouragement. It is all essay on a
high level indicating how the lagging movement of American political
6 ESSAYS IN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY. 0
7 Appendix on "Language and Medicine" in Ogden and Richards' THE
MEANING OF MEANING (2d ed. 1927).
8 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND POLITICS (1930).
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life can be urged forward and brought measurably abreast and in rea-
sonable control of the tremendous economic forces and technological
achievements of the time.
The fundamental principle of American eighteenth century constitution-
making was expressed by John Dickinson in terms which demonstrate its
greatest weakness. "Who are a free people? Not those over whom Gov-
ernment is reasonably and equitably exercised, but those who live under
Government so constitutionally checked and controlled that proper provi-
sion is made against its being otherwise exercised." A device to meet a
particular circumstance, to wit the supremacy of Parliament over the
colonies, was erected into a universal principle.
Today, leading politicians, incapable of inductive reasoning from the
events of their own time, still repeat the political aphorisms of the eigh-
teenth century which they learned in their college days. "As a man's
family," says Bagehot, "go on muttering in his maturity incorrect phrases
derived from a just observation of his early youth, so, in the full activity
of an historical constitution, its subjects repeat phrases true in the time
of their fathers, and inculcated by those fathers, but now true no longer."
Meantime the complexity of our economic "civilization" increases at a
geometrical ratio.
There are two -ways of modernizing our constitutional procedures. One
is to revise the constitution itself and make it more elastic for the future.
Though we or our descendants may some day come to this, the political
and technical difficulties are enormous. The other way is to make the
constitution work. "Sensible shareholders, I have heard a shrewd attor-
ney say, can work any deed of settlement," remarks Bagehot; "and so the
men of Massachusetts could, I believe, work any constitution." This is the
method advocated by Frankfurter of Massachusetts-good government
within constitutional limits by better administration.
The first chapter paints the differences between the life of colonial times
and that of the twentieth century in terms of needs and therefore types
of legislation. Theories of government must be made to fit present reali-
ties. "We are too prone to dissociate problems of law and government
from the general texture of society." Government by commissions may
be necessary in America as well as in England (Chief Justice Hewart to
the contrary notwithstanding) to prevent the rigidity of the American
system from frustrating all government.
The second chapter, in temperate mood, explains the obstacles to political
progress interposed by Supreme Court decisions registering the attitude
of conservatism "in a period dominated by fears." These obstacles are
only temporary, for the pressure of social needs and the education that
goes with it gradually bring the correlation of law. Devices are developed:
uniform state laws, reciprocal state legislation, conferences of governors,
administrative commissions, joint sessions of state agencies, federal legis-
lation complementing state action, the development of regional cooperation
in place of state sovereignty. Fle.xdbility is there while pundits are denying
its existence. "We see," says Frankfurter, "that the constitution provided
for the future partly by not forecasting it!'
The third chapter summarizes the history of the legislative effort to
control public utilities by rate-making and public service commissions, and
analyzes penetratingly the major difficulties of the problem.
The ultimate political philosophy of the book is in the fourth chapter,
which deals with the struggle of democracy to dominate the tremendous
forces of the time, i.e., to give sound administration, while retaining its
sanity and equilibrium. "We need not fly from one romantic absolute to
another. If we focus attention on the human origin of all government,"
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(how different this from the absolutes of James Otis and John Adamsl)
"we shall have a more scientific temper for dealing with its frailties.
We shall equally avoid blind attachment and romantic impatience only if
we recognize the essentially provisional nature of all political arrange-
ments."
The argument culminates in an eloquent appeal for the application of
scientific standards, for the development of experts in the civil service,
for leadership by the trained and the intelligent in all branches of govern-
ment. It is natural that such an appeal should conclude with the apos-
trophe of Huxley to America in 1877 which still makes our flesh creep
with its challenge to the conscience of the nation--"I cannot say that I
am in the slightest degree impressed by your bigness, or your material
resources, as such. Size is not grandeur, and territory does not make a
nation. The great issue, about which hangs a true sublimity and the
terror of overhanging fate, is what are you going to do with all these
things?"
There is no intellectual fumbling in the answer which Professor Frank-
furter gives as to what may be done in the sphere of government.
New Haven, Conn. CHARLES P. HOWLAND.
Handbook of the Law of Insurance. By William R. Vance. Sec-
ond Edition. St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1930. pp. xv,
1104.
THE twentieth century has witnessed the growth of few businesses com-
parable to that of insurance. The amount of life insurance has quadrupled
in the last fifteen years, after previously having doubled in a similar pe-
riod of time, until it has now passed the hundred billion mark. The value
of property covered by fire insurance easily exceeds that sum. In addi-
tion insurance has spread out from the fields of life, fire, marine and
accident, until now it covers hundreds of types of risks. The expanded
growth of insurance is likewise revealed in the amount of litigation and we
now find thousands of decisions involving insurance law. Occasional texts on
separate fields of insurance have appeared, and a cursory treatment is
sometimes given in the discussion of other topics, but there has been little
effort to furnish the profession with a comprehensive and careful study
of the general aspects of insurance.
Professor Vance's treatise, then, is very timely. It is a good presenta-
tion of insurance law as a whole. The book is no mere compilation of
cases, although a large number of selected cases are cited. The doctrines
of the courts are critically examined, and the author has thoroughly de-
veloped his own conclusions as to the soundness of their decisions. The
book appears as a second edition, but it is more than that. Such topics
as "Waiver and Estoppel" and "Rights of the Parties" have been almost
entirely rewritten, so that but little trace of the old remains, and much
new matter has been introduced.
In the first few chapters the author has followed the general scheme
of his first edition; but there are many improvements. Of particular in-
terest are his discussions of the business of insurance and the insurance
contract. His statement of the general theory of insurable interest is
improved. New sections are devoted to such developments in insurance
law as the possibility of a tort action because of the insurer's delay in
acting on an application, and the various remedies open to the insured
when the contract is wrongfully terminated by the insurer.
The author has combined the topics of concealment, representations and
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warranties under a heading, "Devices for Ascertaining and Controlling
Risk and Loss." While statutes have in large measure done away with
the technical meaning of a warranty and thus made the subject of rela-
tively less importance than heretofore, it still remains essential to deter-
mine just what the risk is. Much trouble has been caused in insurance
cases by the statement that a representation will not avoid unless it is
fraudulently made. The author's conclusion that a material misrepresenta-
tion will avoid, even though not fraudulent, but that a representation of
things not susceptible of present knowledge is a representation of belief
and so will not avoid if the belief was truly stated, not only seems sound
but also furnishes a basis upon which most of the cases can be reconciled.
The author's favorite doctrine that a fraudulent immaterial representation
will not avoid is perhaps over-emphasized.
The space allotted to waiver and estoppel has been doubled and a much
abler presentation is made. The discussion of the elusive term, waiver, is
particularly well done. The author points out that the term is loosely
used in such situations as conditions upon the offer, statements to bar de-
fenses, repudiation, election, assumption of excepted losses and substitute
agreements, in all of which, except the second, the term is wrongly used.
He would meet the conflicting statements as to the necessity of considera-
tion by saying that it is required only in the last two classes. The author
makes valuable use of the Hohfeldian analysis in bringing the real prob-
lems to light and his discussion is marked by a careful use of words.
The great majority of state courts, while differing widely in their rea-
sons, admit parol testimony of conversations between the insured and the
agent at the inception of the contract. By stressing the equitable origin
of estoppel and by construing the term broadly, the author justifies the
results reached in most of these cases upon the theory that they involve
no violation of the parol evidence rule. But to many there will be left
the conviction that a similar liberal interpretation of estoppel in other
branches of contract law would leave to the parol evidence rule little of
value. The ablest courts-England, the United States, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, and now New York I-are opposed to the conclusions reached
by Mr. Vance.
Little change has been made in the chapter dealing with insurance agents
and their powers. Insurance cases are the bane of the agency teacher's
existence. The typical agency case does not cover a situation where notice
of the limitation on the agent's authority is communicated to the third
person. While many of the insurance cases may be justified on the theory
that, in spite of the written limitation, the agent had actual authority be-
cause of the insurer's conduct, there are many cascs which rely on a doc-
trine of apparent authority that is hard to reconcile with the limitation.
Two chapters in the new edition replace one in the old dealing with
rights under the policy, and the space given to this topic has been in-
creased from forty three to one hundred and fifty three pages. W"hile
much of this increase is due to the treatment of new developments in the
field, there is also a much more thorough discussion of the older subjects.
The vested interest of the beneficiary as an implied declaration of trust,
the analysis of the situation where the power to change the beneficiary is
reserved, and the problems arising in the assignment of both fire and life
policies are all well handled. The past few years have seen a great use
of insurance as a means of reducing taxes as well as for collateral se-
curity and other business purposes. The author has faithfully recorded
" Minsker v. Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 254 N. Y. 333, 173
N. E. 4 (1930).
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the growth of the law along these lines and has added sections dealing
with insurance trusts, death duties, tax exemption statutes, and the powers
of the trustee in bankruptcy. Other new sections deal with the facility of
payment clause, insurance for children, death in a common disaster and
the effects of divorce.
In the last six chapters the author successively treats fire, life, marine
and accident insurance and closes with an omnibus chapter which includes
liability, fidelity, burglary, credit, theft, group, state, war risk and other
forms of insurance. The standard fire policy is discussed clause by clause
as in the first edition and the changes in the text are largely duo to
alterations in the New York standard policy. Outstanding in the chapter
on life insurance is the discussion of the incontestable clause, and in the
accident insurance field, the summary of the law with reference to acci-
dental injuries is particularly helpful.
Criticisms can of course be made. The subject of proximate cause re-
ceives a scattering treatment and might better have been given a thor-
ough analysis in the early part of the book. Upon such topics as rela-
tionship as an insurable interest, the expectancy interest of the beneficiary
in certain policies, and suicide. as an implied exception when the policy
is payable to the insured's estate, the favorable declarations of the courts
seem unduly minimized. An altered headnote in section forty two, without
a corresponding change in the text, brings about contradictory statements
concerning the author's belief as to the amount that an infant, upon dis-
affirming a policy, should recover. The amount of space allotted to fire
and automobile liability seems disproportionate. The requirements of a
one volume edition perhaps justify the brevity of the treatment given to
such problems as the overlapping of fidelity insurance and corporate sure-
tyship, and the duty owed by insurer to insured when the latter is sued
for an amount in excess of the insurance and the plaintiff offers to settle
for a smaller sum.
Agreement is impossible on all points in any subject as broad as in-
surance. And any objections that may be made are far more than out-
weighed by the advantages of the book. In its comprehensive review of
the subject matter, in its analysis of specific problems, and in its inclusion
of new developments in insurance, the book is outstanding. Professor
Vance's first edition was a leader in its field. The second edition is not
only immeasurably superior to the first, but is easily the best American
work on the subject.
Columbus, Ohio. JOHN E. HALLEN.
The Constitution and What It Means Today. By Edward S.
Corwin. Fourth Edition. Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1930. pp.xxviii, 160. $2.
ALmOST all whose trade it is to interpret, or to interpret the interpreters,
have wondered what the Constitution as a whole means today. Wonder has
led to the idea of rewriting the document in terms of its current meaning.
The temptation has usually gone no further than wonder and idea; but
Edward S. Corwin has had the hardihood to attempt the feat. He has set
down, in their regular order, the articles, the sections and the sub-sections,
and has followed each unit of the text with an explanation of its current
meaning, as expounded by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The author--or commentator or expositor-is quite aware of the hazards
of the enterprise. A series of decisions, which takes its sprawling course
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as the cases which come along demand, is to be reduced to explicit state-
ment. A judicial utterance, always lengthy, often discursive, sometimes
confusing, is to be converted into clear-cut propositions. Amid the volum-
inous reports of the court "the sense of the meeting" is to be spelled out.
The venture demands its own kind of good writing; there is a demand for
delicacy and skill in the choice of words, the formulation of statements,
the crowding of extended and tangled interpretation into compact language.
The classic simplicity of the original document is there as a standard for
Corwin's restatement of the supreme law of the land.
The challenge is ably met by the author. The Constitution has not
ceased to be a controversial subject, and even what the Supreme Court
has held in particular cases is not beyond dispute. If half a dozen of
the ablest students of constitutional law should attempt separately to set
down the current meaning of the historical document, there would by no
means be unanimity among their several results. The reviewer is sure that
in passages he can detect Corwin's own interpretations; and here and there
he is tempted to note exceptions and to voice dissent. But in general the
author has, in quite intelligible terms, packed the preiailing meaning into
the constitution of today; the burden of proof is clearly upon one who
would have the newer te- otherwise. If here and there the author's words
are of doubtful meaning, and invite a conflicting understanding, the in-
firmity is shared by the text of the document itself. The volumes of the
U. S. reports are well on their way toward the three hundred mark; here
the constitution old, and the constitution new, are set down in one hundred
and sixty small, but consequential, pages.
The book gives a real perspective to the fundamental law of the land.
It reveals the striking contrast between the words engrossed on parchment
in 1787, later formally amended, and the institution of the constitution
as it currently operates. A number of the original provisions invite no
comment; cases involving "titles of nobility" and "bills of attainder" do not
come along. A number of the sections have been remade by a growth
of customs which were not foreseen; the formula for the election of the
President, even as amended, falls short of comprehending the process of
actual selection; the appointive power of the chief executive is qualified by
a system of party government for which the instrument does not provide.
A few passing phrases have been elaborated into veritable codes. The
power of Congress over commerce "among the several states" was tucked
away by the Founding Fathers between the trade "with foreign nations"
and "with the Indian tribes;" its present-day meaning even in briefest
compass, demands a statement of nine pages. The "due process clause,"
the end of the meaning of which is not yet, invites a recitation longer than
than the original document. The Constitution was, and is, and will be; its
abiding words carry an expanding and changing significance.
In form this book of Corwin's is statement; in substance it is a revela-
tion of growth. It shows, as no casebook which works its exegetical way
from power to power can easily do, how the nature of the constitution
has changed. The Supreme Court, in spite of the lack of a formal warrant
in the document, has come to be the official interpreter. As a result Judicial
Review has come to be the dominant institution; Constitution Law, as the
author has elsewhere defined it, is "a body of rules which the courts have
imposed upon themselves and observe with greater or less fidelity in the
exercise of Judicial Review." It is the voice of the interpreter which gives
character to the whole law of the Constitution; yet the office is of extra-
constitutional growth.
Once the Constitution want~d expounding; now the exposition needs to
be rested upon the Constitution. The genius of a constitution, whether
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written or unwritten, lies in usage. It is an increasing appreciation of this
which distinguishes the fourth edition of this book from the first. The
volume and the author, like their subject, are alive; they are in process of
growth.
New Haven, Conn. WAIrON H. HAMILTON.
Progress of the Law in the United States Supreme Court, 1929-
1930. By Gregory Hankin and Charlotte A. Hankin. Wash-
ington, Legal Research Service, 1930. pp. xiii, 483. $5.
THIS book is a convenient and accurate review of the work of the United
States Supreme Court at the October term, 1929. It is fuller and more
satisfactory than a similar volume issued by the authors for the October
term, 1928. Although he had read the opinions of the Court in the ad-
vance sheets as they appeared, the reviewer felt adequately compensated
for the time spent in reading the authors' discussion. Particularly valu-
able is the account of cases in which certiorari was denied or appeal dis-
missed. Without a review of this character, supplementing the Legal Re-
search Service edited by the authors of this volume, one gets only a
partial view of the business before the Court. The authors may, how-
ever, enhance the usefulness of their work by supplying citations to the
Federal Reporter and to the several editions of Supreme Court reports,
so far as they are available.
A reader of the present volume is impressed with the fact that the
activities of the Court now have very largely to do with economic prob-
lems, and further with the fact that, in the consideration of such issues,
the Court is passing upon questions -whose determination depends upon
the specific facts of individual cases. Such issues are quite different from
those of broad political principle which required a large part of the Court's
time in earlier days.
Of considerable interest is the chapter on problems in administration,
which should be read in connection with the valuable article by Professors
Frankfurter and Landis, in the November, 1930, issue of the HARVARD LAW
REVIEW, "The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929.."
The reviewer would in no way seek to detract from the great credit given
by the authors to Chief Justice Taft for the passage of the Jurisdictional
Act of 1925, but wishes also to suggest that the late Chief Justice always
gave credit to Mr. Justice Van! Devanter and to the other members of
the committee of the Court who were responsible for the preparation of
the measure.
Chicago, Ill. WALTER F. DODD.
Saving Taxes in Draiting Wills and Trusts. By Joseph J. Robin-
son. Kansas City, Vernon Law Book Co., 1930. pp. xviii,
584. $7.50.
THE author of this book is a Chicago lawyer and tax counsel for the Chi-
cago Title and Trust Company. In addition to a reprint of the estate
tax, income tax and administrative provisions of the Revenue Acts of'
1926 and 1928, the volume contains a digest of the Treasury Regulations,
the rulings of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the decisions of the
Board of Tax Appeals and appellate courts relating to federal estate and
income taxes as they bear on decedents' estates and trusts. It also in-
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eludes a limited discussion of various state inheritance tax questions. The
book will be of substantial value only to persons having a certain amount
of estate and trust work who do not have ready access to the Commerce
Clearing House or Prentice-Hall Federal Tax Services. But even for
them the usefulness of the book will be limited by the fact that the mat-
ters covered by it are in such a rapid state of flux that reference to cur-
rent rulings and decisions will still nearly always be necessary.
The most serious criticism of the book is that its title is distinctly mis-
leading. One would expect to find that the book is made up in large part
of suggestions for minimizing estate and income taxes--a book of the
character of the earlier volumes of Robert Montgomery's brilliant and
original Income Tax Procedure. Montgomery riddled many of the Treas-
ury rulings and court decisions, and gave to lawyers and accountants
throughout the country ideas and courage with which to challenge success-
fully the Treasury Department on many close points. But one looks al-
most in vain for originality in Mr. Robinson's book. There are but few
suggestions that any of the current regulations, rulings, or decisions are
unsound, and such suggestions as are made are backed by little persuasive
reasoning. For example, Mr. Robinson on page 224 defines a revocable
insurance trust as one in which the donor, -who is also the inmircd, does
not surrender full control over the insurance policies, etc., thereby giving
the impression that one of the essentials of an irrevocable insurance trust
is that the trust be established by the insured. This, however, is not cor-
rect. Many insurance trusts (revocable or irrevocable) are established
by persons other than the insured. A wife, for example, having an insur-
able interest in the life of her husband, may, and not infrequently does,
take out policies of insurance on her husband's life, and then deposit the
policies in an insurance trust. If the wife takes out the policies and
pays the premiums on them, the proceeds of the policies will be exempt
from estate tax because the estate tax applies to insurance paid under
"policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life." I From the estate
tax standpoint, this plan is much more desirable than if the husband took
out policies on his own life and paid the premiums on them, because then
the proceeds of the policy payable at his death would be taxable.
Mr. Robinson's statement, citing May v. Hciizr,2 Caonnissionc" of In-
ternal Revenue v. Northern Trmst Co.3 and MeCaughn. v,. Carnill,4 that
S. . the creator of an irrevocable trust may reserve to himself an an-
nuity for life without incurring federal estate taxes" (p. 215), is also of
questionable soundness. It is true that the Northern Trust Co. and Carnill
decisions hold that a transfer such as the author describes is not taxable and
and the language in Mlay v. Heiner also tends to sustain this position. But,
on the other hand, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Keeney v. Comptroller of the State of New York S held that such a transfer
in trust is a transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after the donor's death within the meaning of the New York Transfer Tax
Law, and there is no apparent reason why a different interpretation should
be given to the Federal statute. The Bureau of Internal Revenue immedi-
ately challenged the correctness of the decisions in the Norticrn Trust Co.
and Carnill cases, and the Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari
in the former case. One who creates a trust of the kind in question,
144 STAT. 70 (1926), 26 U. S. C. § 1094 (g) (1926).
2 281 U. S. 238, 50 Sup. Ct. 286 (1930).
341 F. (2d) 732 (1930).
443 F. (2d) 69 (1930).
5222 U. S. 525, 32 Sup. Ct. 105 (1912).
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relying on Mr. Robinson's statement, may find (or his executor or heirs
may find) that he has been woefully misled.
New York City. BERNHARD KNOLLENBERG.
Das deutsche internationale Privatrecht auf Grundlage der
Rechtsprechung. By Hans Lewald. Leipzig, Bernhard Tauch-
nitz, 1931. pp. xvi, 386. RM. 22.
PROFEssoR LEWALD, of the University of Frankfort, presents in this volume
the German Conflict of Laws on the basis of the decisions of the courts,
so far as the subject-niktter falls within the German Civil Code. Follow-
ing the discussion of a few topics of a general character, such as renvol
and public order, the presentation follows the order of the Code, i.o., Gen-
eral Part, Law of Obligations, Law of Things, Family Law, and Law of
Inheritance. In view of the limits drawn by the author, matters assigned
to other codes, such as the Commercial Code or the Code of Civil Procedure,
are excluded.
The work appears to have been written primarily for the RBpcrtoirc do
Droit International, published by A. de Lapradelle and J. P. Niboyet, of
which the seventh volume has recently appeared, and this no doubt, ac-
counts for the fact that the work has assumed a pre-eminently practical
character. It contains a full discussion of the cases, which is not found
in any other German work on the subject. The author does not hesitate
to express his views where the decisions are in conflict, or with respect
to points on which there are no cases, but, in accordance with his general
object, he refrains from developing any general theory of his own. That
growing interest on the part of German jurists in the practical workings
of the law.
The task-undertaken by Professor Lewald has been performed in an ad-
mirable manner and the little volume should receive a warm welcome from
all interested in the German Conflict of Laws.
New Haven, Conn. ERNEST G. LORENZEN.
Nationality Within the British Commonwealth of Nations. By
E. F. W. Grey Van Pittius. London, P. S. King & Son, Ltd.,
1930. pp. xvi, 238. 10/-.
THIs treatise, a doctoral dissertation presented at the University of Lon-
don by the senior lecturer in political science at the University of Pretoria,
is a study of the nationality laws of the United Kingdom and the dom-
inions of the British Empire. The author examines the four kinds of
British subjects which the peculiar municipal and constitutional organiza-
tion of the British dominions has brought into being. Although the provi-
sions of the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1914 (Imperial
Nationality Act) as to native-born subjects are uniform throughout the
Empire, in the matter of naturalized citizens each dominion can legislate
freely; and while most of them have adopted the provisions of the Im-
perial Act of 1914, some, like New Zealand, have not. Certain of the
dominions, for example Canada, South Africa, and Ireland have passed
separate nationality laws. If the Colonial Laws Validity Act is to be
the author of such a work should be a university professor is proof of a
repealed, as proposed at the recent Imperial Conference (convened since
the publication of the work under review), each dominion will recover its
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full right to adopt separate nationality laws. How far they would go in
this respect remains to be seen. The curious result that a person may be
a naturalized British subject in Australia, but not in England, is illus-
trated by Markwalds case.1  The author sketches such subjects as dual
nationality, statelessness, and domicile. With respect to the status of
married women, the Imperial Conference of 1930 recommended the adop-
tion of the proposals of the Hague Codification Conference of 1930, which
fall considerably short of the United States Cable Act of 1922. The au-
thor (p. 140) takes the superficial rather than the correct view of the
German Delbrueck law of July 22, 1913.2 Not the least interesting part
of the book is Chapter XV indicating discriminations practiced in certain
dominions against some British subjects, e. g., those of the colored races.
'The treatment of British nationality in the mandated territories and local
naturalization in the dominions is useful. The book is a substantial con-
tribution to the complicated subject of nationality.
E. Dr. B.
Selected Articles on Censorship of Speech and the Press. Com-
piled by Lamar T. Beman. New York, The H. W. Wilson Co.,
1930. pp. 507. $2.40.
IN conformity with the usual form of the Handbook Series, this highly
-diversified collection of materials on censorship and freedom of speech is
arranged to present affirmative and negative views on various aspects of
the censorship problem. Primarily planned to provide arguments for de-
baters who want reliable information in condensed form, the lawyer may
not find it of specific interest for his purposes. But it is of great value
to students of the field, because it gives a complete view of public opinion
on open discussion and thus affords a political background so essential
to any comprehension of the problem. The legal point of view, however, is
discussed in many articles. We find quotations from Chafee and Cooley
and excerpts from many decisions. There is, for example, a full discussion
of the Minnesota nuisance law with the text of the statute, the decisions
of the Minnesota Supreme Court relating to it, and documents of the pub-
lishers' fight against the law. On the whole the volume will be found to
be one of considerable usefulness.
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